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The Army's implementation of the LG branch in 2008 was not an end state, but rather the latest milestone in an ongoing evolutionary process to improve how best to sustain our fighting forces and develop our logistics leaders. The implementation required detailed planning that was able to capitalize on an impressive body of scholarly work. However, the implementation had some unintended consequences that require attention. Overall, LG branch implementation has been successful, widely accepted, and provided great benefit to the Army. There is always room for improvement, and the history of sustainment evolution indicates that more change is on the way.
THE EVOLUTION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THE LOGISTICS OFFICER CORPS
As Logistics officers progress through their careers, and the more senior they become, the more time they spend planning and executing missions that involve all aspects of logistics. When an officer reaches the fieldgrade level, from major to colonel, they not only participate in logistics activities at the tactical and operational levels but also at the joint and strategic levels. These joint and strategic levels involve coordination with the Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, and even other countries. Officers must have a wide range of logistics expertise and knowledge in order to be effective. The methodology to researching and answering those questions in this paper is four fold. Firstly by framing in a historical context the past century of Army reforms, this paper will demonstrate that changes to sustainment and logistical leader development are evolutionary. Secondly the author will review the development and planning that led to the implementation of the LG branch. Thirdly by analyzing from a personnel management perspective the changes to the force structure within the officer logistics community and by examining how officers are assigned within this force structure, this paper will demonstrate some unintended consequences, particularly on how our most junior officers are employed. Finally the author will examine elements of the professional military education system within the logistics community and present recommendations on how to better develop our multifunctional logistics officer corps.
There are a number of other aspects pertaining to the future of the logistics corps that merit additional scholarly research. that it was merely another step in an ongoing process of change to improve the way in which we sustain our forces and develop our leaders. Following is a timeline of more than a century of these evolutionary steps that help to frame the historical context of change to our sustainment structure and officer development, all of which has contributed to the formation of the LG branch. would still talk to and be assigned by an LG assignment officer with a QM functional background. However, the concern with the assignment officer's loss of visibility of positions requiring functional expertise could, and sometimes did, lead to the career manager assigning that same LG major with a QM functional background to a position requiring TC or OD specific skills and expertise. LTG Stevenson addressed this loss of functional identity in his 2010 article when he stated, "Of more concern is the notion that any logistics officer can do any job, so why pay attention to an officer's functional area of expertise?" 40 He went on to say, "every LG officer is required to have a functional area of expertise." 41 More specifically, he stated:
If you look at how we coded the positions for logistics officers on tables of organization and equipment and tables of distribution and allowances… they are not all coded 90A! We could have done that, but we deliberately did not because we recognize the fact that jobs remain out there that are more functional than multifunctional and thus require a particular skill and experience. After all, the CG HRC, MG Gina S. Farrisee, had concurred with the NOFC and assured the senior logistics leadership that HRC would be able to incorporate SQIs into the requisition process. What MG Hodge was concerned with were units in the field losing visibility of their functional logistics positions now that the authorization documents would only identify functionality in a separate 'SQI' column. This was neither a column nor codes with which units were familiar. 45 As late as April 2012, a full six months after the specified changes went into affect, assignment officers at FSD and Senior Leader Division state that they still only receive 90A00 valid requisitions. 46 For the LG branch to function as conceived and approved, the Army must fix the requisition process so that every functional position is properly coded. This would appear to be a simple automated process that populates the proper codes into the requisition. As previously mentioned in the historical timeline, the genesis for the Army and the SCOE could better serve the logistics officer corps if they were able to establish similar advanced degree programs for field grade officers at ALU.
Conclusion
The Army's implementation of the LG branch in 2008 was not an end state, but rather the latest milestone in an ongoing evolutionary process to improve how best to sustain our fighting forces and develop our logistics leaders. The implementation required detailed planning that was able to capitalize on an impressive body of scholarly work by officers who spent the previous decade contemplating if and how best to establish a logistics officer corps. LG branch implementation has been successful, widely accepted, and provided great benefit to the Army. There is always
